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A B S T R A C T
Many resource-rich countries face the paradoxical situation that their wealth in natural resources coincides with
low economic and human development rates. To address this so-called resource curse, academics and practi-
tioners turn their hopes to institutional quality. Yet whether, how and with what consequences institutional
quality is transformed in resource curse contexts remains poorly understood, especially so at subnational levels.
The most widely implemented initiative that seeks to address the resource curse through enhanced institutional
quality is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This article analyses to what extent and how
the EITI transforms institutional quality at national and subnational levels in Myanmar, focusing on transpar-
ency, civil society participation and accountability. We show that many transformations go beyond the oﬃcial
EITI process and report. While the EITI report itself is not heavily used by civil society organisations (CSOs), the
EITI process motivated CSOs to gather data and organise themselves both around and beyond EITI-related issues
at subnational levels. Such participatory processes of constituting transparency improved relations between the
(regional) government, CSOs and private companies, but also created new forms of in- and exclusion among civil
society. While avenues opened up for CSOs to demand accountability regarding the impacts of resource ex-
traction, the extent to which they are able to trigger action of extractive industry actors in their region remains
limited. In conclusion, we argue that transformations in institutional quality are not characterised by a linear
trajectory from transparency in the form of the EITI report to accountability, facilitated by civil society parti-
cipation in EITI multi-stakeholder groups, as the EITI standard posits. Rather, transformations in institutional
quality are characterised by spin-oﬀs, dynamic interlinkages, trade-oﬀs, limitations and a reinforcing cycle
between participation and transparency within and beyond the EITI.
1. Introduction
Many resource-rich countries around the world face the paradoxical
situation that their wealth in natural resources coincides with lower
economic and human development rates than countries without re-
source abundance. This so-called ‘resource curse’ is characterised by
high levels of corruption, domestic conﬂict, adverse environmental and
social impacts of resource extraction, economic and socio-political in-
equalities, and an overall poor macroeconomic performance (Collier,
2017; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008).
To elucidate the conditions under which resource abundance
translates into a resource curse, academics and practitioners have
turned to analysing institutional quality (for an overview, see
Papyrakis, 2017). Many argue that countries are less likely to experi-
ence the resource curse if they are able to eﬀectively and democrati-
cally govern their natural resources (e.g. Boschini et al., 2013; Mehlum
et al., 2006; Sarmidi et al., 2017). Though an increasing number of
governance initiatives around the world is based on the assumption that
improvements in institutional quality are important in addressing the
resource curse, whether and how this works remains poorly under-
stood. While some governance initiatives helped countries to alleviate
symptoms or even causes of the resource curse (e.g. Caspary, 2012),
others have been ineﬀective or even counterproductive in overcoming
entrenched power asymmetries, opaqueness and resource conﬂicts
(Phillips et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2012).
The most widely implemented governance initiative that seeks to
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T
reverse the resource curse through enhanced institutional quality is the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI is a global
standard to increase transparency in countries’ extractive industries
sectors through the disclosure of information about licenses, produc-
tion, revenues, payments, contracts and ownership (EITI, 2018a). The
EITI is founded on the idea that transparency, in combination with civil
society participation, can increase accountability in the extractive in-
dustries sector. So far, however, studies provide inconclusive evidence
on the extent to which the EITI actually increases transparency, civil
society participation and accountability, and whether it helps to ad-
dress the resource curse (Corrigan, 2014; Papyrakis et al., 2017; Rustad
et al., 2017). We argue that key to understanding the relation between
institutional quality and the resource curse is a focus on the inter-
linkages between diﬀerent aspects of institutional quality.
This article advances such understandings by analysing to what
extent and how the EITI transforms transparency, civil society partici-
pation and accountability in Myanmar, a country with prominent re-
source curse symptoms. While Myanmar has abundant natural re-
sources, it is one of the least developed countries in the world,
experiences severe adverse environmental and social impacts from re-
source extraction, and has a long history of domestic conﬂicts fuelled by
the extraction of valuable resources (James, 2010; Perry, 2007; Pick
and Thein, 2010). Myanmar became a candidate to the EITI in 2014,
motivated explicitly by the aspiration to address its resource curse
(Thein Sein, 2013; May Soe, 2014). The EITI also raised high expecta-
tions for boosting civil society's historically very low political partici-
pation and for addressing the adverse impacts from resource extraction.
Myanmar is one of the few countries that has initiated EITI activities at
the subnational level in order to stimulate wider public debates around
natural resource governance. This makes Myanmar an interesting case
to study to what extent and how the EITI transforms institutional
quality in a resource curse context at the national and subnational le-
vels.
This article draws on a literature review and twelve months of
ﬁeldwork in Myanmar by the lead author (September 2016-August
2017), during which most of the interviews were carried out to gain in-
depth understanding of the eﬀects of the EITI. In June 2017, additional
interviews were carried out by three of the authors in two regions in
Myanmar. In total, the article draws on more than eighty semi-struc-
tured individual and group interviews in various regions of Myanmar,
Chiang Mai (Thailand) and London with civil society, private sector and
government representatives. Interviewees were selected based on their
involvement in and knowledge of the design and implementation of the
EITI in Myanmar.
We proceed as follows: the next section reviews literature on the
relationship between the EITI, institutional quality and the resource
curse, and identiﬁes the EITI's theory of change. Section 3 describes
Myanmar's natural resource context and governance, including the
implementation of the EITI. Section 4 analyses to what extent and how
the EITI in Myanmar transforms institutional quality at national and
subnational levels. Section 5 revisits the EITI's theory of change, fo-
cusing speciﬁcally on the interlinkages between diﬀerent aspects of
institutional quality. Finally, Section 6 captures the article's main con-
tributions and identiﬁes areas for future research.
2. Addressing the resource curse by transforming institutional
quality
2.1. The EITI's theory of change
In seeking to explain why some countries are able to translate their
natural resource wealth into strong human and economic development
while others experience the resource curse, the pivotal role of institu-
tional quality has been widely recognised (Boschini et al., 2013;
Brunnschweiler, 2008; Epremian et al., 2016; Mehlum et al., 2006;
Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). The assumption is that high institutional
quality can reduce (symptoms of) the resource curse by providing
checks and balances against rent-seeking, corruption, excessive
spending and an unequal division of the costs and beneﬁts of resource
extraction (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009).
The most widely implemented governance initiative that seeks to
reverse the resource curse through enhanced institutional quality is the
EITI, which is currently implemented in ﬁfty-one (mostly developing)
countries around the world. Countries that are candidate to the EITI are
required to disclose information about their extractive industries sector
through an oﬃcial EITI report; establish a multi-stakeholder group
(MSG) of government, private sector and civil society representatives to
implement the EITI; and create public awareness and debates around
natural resource governance (EITI, 2016).
The EITI was founded on the idea that “transparency and dialogue
had to be part of the starting point” in addressing the resource curse
(EITI, 2018b). This article assesses the validity of the EITI's theory of
change, namely that “[t]he active participation of civil society in the
EITI process is key to ensure that transparency created by the EITI leads
to greater accountability” (EITI, 2016, 42). Through these changes, the
EITI indirectly seeks to facilitate the “prudent use” of natural resources,
contribute to sustainable development and prevent “negative economic
and social impacts” from resource extraction, and thereby address the
resource curse (EITI, 2016, 11) (Fig. 1).
2.2. The role of transparency, participation and accountability
Studies exist—albeit inconclusive—on whether and how transpar-
ency, participation and accountability help to address the resource
curse. Most studies focus on each of these institutional aspects sepa-
rately, rather than on the interlinkages between them. In the following,
we discuss causal assumptions between each of these aspects and the
resource curse.
The idea behind enhancing transparency in resource curse contexts is
that increased information access may help to constrain abilities of
elites to appropriate resource rents and form patronage networks in
opaque manners (Corrigan, 2014; Epremian et al., 2016; Kolstad and
Wiig, 2009; Williams, 2011). Enhancing transparency may also increase
trust and mitigate conﬂicts between stakeholders (Collier, 2017;
Epremian et al., 2016; Hauﬂer, 2010), including at subnational levels
(Aguilar et al., 2011). However, transparency can only improve the
governance of natural resources if aﬀected actors can act upon the
enhanced access to information. This ability depends on, among others,
the quality of the available information, actors’ abilities to process in-
formation, and actors’ abilities to take or evoke action (Brockmyer,
2016; Epremian et al., 2016; Fox, 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009;
Stevens and Dietsche, 2008; Vijge, 2018).
Enhancing civil society participation in resource curse contexts can
strengthen the representation or participation of aﬀected stakeholders
in the governance of natural resources. The EITI seeks to reorganise
participation in resource governance by creating multi-stakeholder
groups (MSGs). MSGs can create opportunities for civil society to raise
their voice on unequal rent distribution or environmental and social
impacts of resource extraction (Phillips et al., 2016). In many EITI-
implementing countries, however, MSGs reveal unequal partnerships
between stakeholders, a lack of full civil society participation and/or
poor representation of aﬀected citizens (Aaronson, 2011; Furstenberg,
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Fig. 1. The EITI's theory of change.
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2015; Hauﬂer, 2010; Smith et al., 2012; Sovacool and Andrews, 2015).
Finally, enhancing accountability of governments and extractive
companies in resource curse contexts can help citizens to enforce re-
sponsibilities around, for example, the equitable sharing of revenues
and the environmental and social impacts of resource extraction
(Corrigan, 2014; Mejía Acosta, 2013). This requires citizens to be
willing and able to call and eﬀectively push for improvements in re-
source governance. Even if responsible actors are held to account and
requested to take action (so-called answerability), they are not always
willing or able to change their actions (Caspary, 2012; Collier, 2017;
Epremian et al., 2016; Fox, 2007).
2.3. Does the EITI help to address the resource curse?
So far, studies show mixed results on whether the EITI actually re-
verses the resource curse through changes in transparency, participa-
tion and accountability.
On the one hand, Rustad et al. (2017) argue that the EITI has ef-
fectively created new standards for auditing and reporting in resource-
rich countries and that EITI MSGs enhance civil society involvement in
resource governance. Similarly, Caspary (2012) argues that the EITI
enhances transparency and that EITI MSGs help build trust and colla-
boration between stakeholders. Also Corrigan (2014) points to some
early signs of success in the EITI's ability to strengthen governance and
address certain (though not all) aspects of the resource curse.
On the other hand, a number of studies ﬁnd no diﬀerence before and
during EITI compliance, and between EITI member and non-member
countries in most indicators for the resource curse (Öge, 2017;
Scanteam, 2011; Sovacool et al., 2016; Kasekende et al., 2016). Hilson
and Maconachie (2009) argue that the EITI can only promote ac-
countability if there are already strong institutions in place. Shaxson
(2009, 45), even argues that the EITI draws attention away from
“tougher issues related to the resource curse”. Often-mentioned chal-
lenges for the EITI's eﬀectiveness include limited awareness and
knowledge on the EITI; diﬀerent understandings of the EITI among
stakeholders; and insuﬃcient participation, which in turn leads to
limited ways to hold decision-makers accountable (Aaronson, 2011;
Caspary, 2012; Epremian et al., 2016; Rustad et al., 2017; Scanteam,
2011).
The above shows that the extent to which governance in-
itiatives—and the EITI in particular—trigger changes in institutional
quality that help to address the resource curse depends largely on
contextual factors (Epremian et al., 2016). If so, reversing the resource
curse in a context such as Myanmar, which recently embarked on a
democratic transition after decades of military dictatorship, poses sig-
niﬁcant challenges. Given that transparency, participation and ac-
countability are often seen as core elements of democracy, we consider
it a crucial endeavour to analyse contemporaneous changes in these
aspects during Myanmar's democratic transition.
3. The resource curse and the implementation of the EITI in
Myanmar
Myanmar engages in oﬀshore and onshore oil and gas extraction, as
well as extraction of large amounts of gemstones and minerals. Both
large- and small-scale mining takes place in many of Myanmar's four-
teen states and regions (Fig. 2). While Sovacool (2010) points to
shifting evidence for Myanmar's resource curse, in absolute terms the
country exempliﬁes many resource curse symptoms (James, 2010;
Perry, 2007; Pick and Thein, 2010; Thein Sein, 2013). Despite its
wealth in natural resources, Myanmar remains one of the least devel-
oped countries in the world. The distribution of beneﬁts from extractive
industries is severely skewed. While Myanmar's extractive industries
sector generates billions of dollars, most citizens do not proﬁt from this
(Global Witness, 2015). Adverse impacts caused by extractive industries
include forced relocation, environmental pollution, destruction of
livelihoods and negative health eﬀects (Adam Smith International,
2015; Bauer et al., 2016). Myanmar also has longstanding and violent
conﬂicts, many of which are fuelled and sustained by resource extrac-
tion (Holliday, 2012).
Myanmar's natural resource governance framework largely fails to
address those issues. Environmental laws were formulated as recently
as 2012 and remain poorly enforced (Adam Smith International, 2015).
The governance of Myanmar's extractive industries sector is char-
acterised by high levels of corruption and secrecy. According to the
Resource Governance Index, which evaluates countries’ extractive in-
dustries sector on transparency and accountability, Myanmar scored
83rd of the 89 countries (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2017).
A substantial proportion of Myanmar's resource extraction (for gem-
stones even an estimated 70–80%) is illegal and thereby fails to con-
tribute to the state coﬀers (Irwin, 2016; Global Witness, 2015).
Myanmar citizens have very limited opportunities to hold extractive
industry actors to account for their actions. Grievances associated with
resource extraction have historically been addressed with force rather
than through dialogue (Adam Smith International, 2015).
Myanmar recently embarked on a major democratic and economic
reform process. The country made a quick transition from a military
regime to a quasi-civilian government in 2011, to a democratically
elected government at the start of 2016. This reform process coincides
with major adjustments in the country's natural resource governance
framework, which include a number of new and amended laws and
regulations on environmental and social impact mitigation for invest-
ment projects. Civil society participation has been actively promoted in
these eﬀorts (Kramer, 2011; Simpson, 2013). While some CSOs still
operate from the borders of Myanmar, national and local civil society
has become quite vibrant (Matelski, 2016), including around extractive
industries issues.
As a “central part” of its democratic transition, Myanmar committed
to implementing the EITI in 2013 (EITI, 2015). The EITI is seen as “a
useful tool to design [Myanmar's] escape from the resource curse”, as
argued by the former national EITI coordinator (May Soe, 2014). In-
itially, Myanmar's history of civic oppression and human rights viola-
tions made it highly challenging for the three stakeholder group-
s—government, civil society and private sector representatives—to
come together to discuss transparency. Despite this, the MSG managed
to make quick progress, resulting in the publication of Myanmar's ﬁrst
EITI report in January 2016 (Vijge, 2018).
In 2015, the national MSG decided to establish EITI subnational
coordination units (SNCUs) in Myanmar. These units were established
to further stimulate awareness and discussion around the EITI and
natural resource governance within MSGs at the subnational level
(Vijge and Simpson, Forthcoming). Two states, Shan and Rakhine, and
two regions, Magway and Mandalay, were initially chosen to host these
units, mainly because of their abundant natural resources and a gas
pipeline that runs through these areas, with reportedly large negative
impacts. Due to challenges related to the vast size of Shan state and the
conﬂicts in Rakhine state, the subnational units were only established
in the regions Magway and Mandalay.1 Magway has large reserves of
coal, oil and gas, while Mandalay harbours gemstones, gold and other
minerals (Fig. 2). The subnational MSGs that comprise the SNCUs in
Magway and Mandalay include regional and/or local government, civil
society and private sector representatives. These MSGs discuss and
exchange information about region-speciﬁc issues related to resource
extraction.
After the governmental transition at the start of 2016, the national
EITI process was stalled for more than a year, thereby also putting a halt
to the SNCUs in Magway and Mandalay. After Myanmar's successful
application for a one-year extension, Myanmar reinitiated its EITI
process in April 2017, and published its second and third EITI report in
1 Authors’ interview with MATA representatives, 29–5-2017, Yangon.
M.J. Vijge, et al. Resources Policy 61 (2019) 200–209
202
March 2018. Soon after reinitiating the EITI process, the national MSG
decided to (re-)establish the SNCUs, though this decision has not yet
been implemented at the time of writing. Due to the timeframe of the
ﬁeldwork, the article does not consider EITI developments or reports
published after August 2017.
4. The EITI: transforming institutional quality in Myanmar?
This section analyses to what extent and how the EITI transforms
institutional quality at national and subnational levels in Myanmar. A
summary of the ﬁndings can be found in Table 1.
4.1. Transparency
The EITI aims to enhance transparency through the publication and
dissemination of EITI reports. The publication of Myanmar's ﬁrst EITI
report in 2016 was widely heralded as a major achievement in shedding
light on the largely opaque extractive industries sector. However, the
quality of the data has been drawn into question due, in part, to the
very short time-frame for consolidating data.2 Also the uptake of the
report's information by CSOs is rather limited.3 An important reason for
this is the lack of (region-)speciﬁc information, for example about the
regional allocation of licenses, contracts, and the beneﬁcial owners of
extractive industries (Vijge, 2018). More important than transparency
arising from the EITI report was the generation of information by sta-
keholders involved in EITI activities, information that went beyond
what was disclosed in the EITI report.
Fig. 2. Map of Myanmar's natural resources (reprinted from Bauer et al., 2016).
2 Author's interviews with MATA coordinator, 23–9-2016, Yangon; former
MATA coordinator #1, 3–12–2016, Bago.
3 Authors’ interviews with former MATA coordinator #1, 22-9-2016 and 3-
12-2016, Yangon; MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017, Magway; re-
presentative of Magway EITI Watch Group, 12–12-2016, Magway; director of
NGO, 25-11-2016, Yangon.
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In the initial stages of Myanmar's EITI process, it was time-con-
suming and diﬃcult for CSOs to request region-speciﬁc information
from the government, since such requests had to be submitted to the
union level. To obtain information beyond what was disclosed through
the EITI report, CSOs involved in the national EITI process proposed the
establishment of the above-mentioned subnational coordination units
(SNCUs).4 CSOs in both Magway and Mandalay claim that these units
facilitated the exchange of information among government, civil society
and private sector representatives. In some (though not all) instances,
for example, the government responds to calls from CSOs to inspect
extractive industry practices and engages CSOs in these inspections.5
This information exchange, which goes well beyond the EITI report,
is considered important to establish common ground for debates,
thereby building understanding and mutual respect between stake-
holder groups. Initially, for example, CSOs’ interaction with companies
was characterised as highly “emotional”, with CSOs often drawing on
assumptions in levelling blame against companies for negative impacts
on surrounding communities. Gradually, CSOs learned to more eﬀec-
tively communicate with companies and engage in, as one interviewee
called it, “data-based discussions”.6 This increased the quality of civil
society participation in the discussions around resource extraction (see
Section 4.2). Besides informing CSOs, the SNCUs have also enhanced
companies’ awareness and knowledge on their environmental and so-
cial impacts, on impact mitigation rules and measures, and on (inter)
national business standards.7
The SNCUs in Mandalay and Magway also triggered CSOs to ac-
tively collect data beyond what is being disclosed through the EITI
report, sometimes with the help of local communities and/or in colla-
boration with the government and private sector.8 In Mandalay, a so-
called Mandalay EITI working group monitors mining activities in the
18 townships where adverse impacts of resource extraction are most
acutely experienced. Drawing on information disclosed by the govern-
ment and through the EITI report, the working group checks whether
companies’mining licenses are still up-to-date and accurate for the area
in which they operate. As one interviewee explained: “For example, in
Pyaw Bwal Twin village, a lead factory was built (…). The villagers did
not want that factory. They came to us [the Mandalay EITI working
group] and we went to discuss (…). We found out that the factory (…)
did not have permission to operate. We informed this to (…) the gov-
ernment, and then the regional government stopped the factory op-
eration.”9 All this was triggered by, but happened outside the SNCUs,
which were suspended in mid-2016.
Though the SNCUs in Magway and Mandalay have been an im-
portant trigger for the exchange and generation of information on
(impacts from) the regions’ extractive industries, CSOs in Magway and
Mandalay are not fully satisﬁed with the information exchange between
the three stakeholder groups. The regional government and companies
in Magway are criticised for being slow and hesitant to disclose certain,
often sensitive, information. For example, CSOs have in vain requested
information on the beneﬁcial ownership of military- or foreign-owned
companies, important information that is nevertheless beyond what
was disclosed through the EITI report.10
Many civil society representatives are of the opinion that the EITI
has not (yet) been eﬀective in addressing deeply-engrained corruption
within the government, crony companies, or military- or state-owned
companies.11 One might argue that the EITI has so far mainly reaped
the low-hanging fruits. Illegal resource extraction still takes place on a
large scale and remains unscrutinised in the EITI report. Furthermore,
Table 1
Transformations in institutional quality triggered by the EITI at national and subnational levels in Myanmar (own compilation).
Aspect of institutional
quality
Transformations Remaining challenges
Transparency EITI report sheds light on extractive industries sector Validity of data drawn into question. EITI report covers least problematic
resource extraction. EITI has not (yet) addressed deeply engrained
corruption
Triggered by SNCUs, CSOs gather, exchange and use information
beyond EITI report, including on impacts of resource extraction in the
region
Limited use of EITI report by CSOs, partly due to lack of (region-)speciﬁc
information
Companies gain awareness and knowledge about impacts, regulations
and standards
Only willing companies change behaviour and become more transparent
Participation Increase in mutual trust, respect and understanding between CSOs,
government and private sector
In SNCUs, limited engagement of government and companies with
adverse impacts
Enhanced access to actors responsible for impacts of resource extraction
Enhanced self-organisation and empowerment of CSOs, e.g. through
MATA
Unequal representation and disputes among CSOs
Accountability Enhanced public awareness and debates around natural resource
governance
Limited capacity and knowledge base among CSOs and citizens
Enhanced ability of CSOs to demand accountability of responsible actors Limited ability of CSOs to evoke action of responsible actors
4 Author's interview with MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017,
Magway.
5 Authors’ interviews with MATA Magway representatives #1 and #3, 5-6-
2017, Magway; former MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay.
6 Authors’ interview with MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017,
Mandalay. Aﬃrmed by CSO representative Mandalay #2, 3-6-2017, Mandalay;
former MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay; company re-
presentative #1 in EITI MSG Magway, 11-12-2016, Magway; company re-
presentative #2 in EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-2016, Magway.
7 Author's interviews with company representative #1 in EITI MSG Magway,
11-12-2016, Magway; company representative #2 in EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-
2016, Magway.
8 Authors’ interviews with representative of coal mine company #1 involved
in EITI MSG Magway, 11-12-2016, Magway; representative of small-scale oil
company involved in EITI MSG Magway, 11-12-2016, Magway; representative
of Community Learning Centre involved in EITI MSG Magway, 11-12-2016,
Magway; representative of coal mine company #2 involved in MSG Magway,
(footnote continued)
12-12-2016, Magway; representative of international oil company involved in
EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-2016, Magway; CSO representative Mandalay #2, 3-
6-2017, Mandalay; MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay;
former MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay; representative of
Magway EITI Watch Group, 12-12-2016, Magway.
9 Authors’ interviews with CSO representative Mandalay #2, 3-6-2017,
Mandalay. Aﬃrmed by MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017, Magway;
MATA Magway representative #3, 5-6-2017, Magway.
10 Author's interviews with company representative #1 in EITI MSG Magway,
11-12-2016, Magway; MATA Magway representative #1, #2 and #4, 5-6-2017,
Magway; company representative #2 in EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-2016,
Magway.
11 Authors’ interviews with MATA representatives, 29-5-2017, Yangon; MATA
Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017, Magway; CSO representative, 27-7-2017,
Yangon; Myanmar focal point, Global Witness, 31-8-2016, London.
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the selection of the four initially planned SNCUs excluded those regions
where resource extraction is strongly linked to conﬂicts between the
state army and ethnic armed groups, such as Kachin state.12 It was only
in mid-2017 that the national MSG decided to establish an SNCU in
Kachin state. It remains to be seen whether, when and with what eﬀects
this unit will start to operate.
4.2. Participation
As argued in Section 2, enhanced civil society participation in de-
cision-making may improve natural resource governance in resource
curse contexts by creating opportunities for aﬀected stakeholders to be
represented and/or raise their voice. The multi-stakeholder negotia-
tions that preceded Myanmar's EITI candidature in 2013 were the ﬁrst
ever opportunities for CSOs to enter into political discussions with the
government. CSOs generally state satisfaction with their involvement in
the national EITI process (Vijge, 2018). After decades of civic oppres-
sion, it was unprecedented for Myanmar that—unlike in some other
EITI-implementing countries (see e.g. Aaronson, 2011; Kolstad and
Wiig, 2009)—civil society participation was not obstructed, but instead
promoted by the government (Vijge and Simpson, Forthcoming).
Similarly, the SNCUs in Magway and Mandalay opened up political
space for CSOs to engage in discussions around natural resource gov-
ernance: “Because of the EITI, people have a voice”.13 Through their
engagement in the SNCUs, CSOs signiﬁcantly built their capacity to
lobby and collaborate with the government and private sector.14 CSOs
gained tools and venues, as well as a sense of safety that they had long
lacked. Most importantly, as formulated by a CSO representative: “[t]he
best outcome we got was respect and trust (…) [among] the groups.”15
This “mutual understanding”16 between government, civil society and
private sector representatives provided CSOs with better access to
certain, though not all, government agencies and companies. This al-
lowed them to voice their opinion regarding resource extraction in their
region.17 CSOs felt that this was particularly relevant in discussions
around the environmental and social impacts in Magway and Man-
dalay; issues that, again, fall outside the scope of the EITI.18
While the subnational discussions around natural resource govern-
ance happened as a result of the national EITI process, the resulting
transformations go well beyond its conﬁnes. After the national EITI
process was suspended at the beginning of 2016, national-level support
for the SNCUs discontinued, but civil society participation in subna-
tional resource governance persisted. In Magway, for example, CSOs
have taken a leading role in initiating EITI- and natural resource-related
activities through a so-called EITI watch group. Although the EITI was
the motive to establish the EITI watch group, its activities consist of
organising discussions with companies and joint monitoring of the en-
vironmental and social impacts of resource extraction in the region.19
It is important to note that subnational discussions and activities
around such adverse impacts happen despite the fact that the national
MSG decided against including these issues in the EITI report. CSOs
exerted large pressure and even threatened to withdraw from the na-
tional EITI process if impacts could not be discussed. The government's
aspiration to make quick progress towards compliance with the more
narrow EITI requirements was ultimately decisive in the resolution to
exclude environmental and social impacts from the EITI report (Vijge,
2018). Ostensibly, trade-oﬀs exist at the national level between (quick)
compliance with the EITI standard and inclusiveness of voice, as one
interviewee also asserted: “We need the right balance. Yes, the process
needs to be successful, but it also needs to be meaningful so that it has
traction with broader citizens and lead to meaningful reform and
changes for the lives of people”.20 These trade-oﬀs are less prominent at
the subnational level, since SNCUs are not a requirement of the EITI
standard.
While the above shows a high level of civil society participation in
and beyond the SNCUs, the prominent role of civil society is also linked
to limited engagement of other actors in the oﬃcial EITI process. Even
before the suspension of the national EITI process, for example, CSOs
criticised the regional governments of Magway and Mandalay for their
limited understanding of and engagement in the SNCUs.21 Furthermore,
since participation in the SNCUs is voluntary, companies with large
adverse environmental and social impacts are generally not involved in
the SNCUs.22
To organise civil society representation in the national and subna-
tional EITI process, a core group of CSOs established the Myanmar
Alliance for Transparency and Accountability (MATA) in 2014. MATA
is one of the ﬁrst CSO alliances in Myanmar, consisting of reportedly
580 CSOs.23 MATA is founded on the idea that civil society needs “to
speak with one loud voice”24 in the EITI process in order to form a
strong negotiating block, particularly vis-à-vis the historically very
12 Author's interview with MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017,
Magway.
13 Authors’ interview with MATA Magway representatives #1, 5-6-2017,
Magway. Aﬃrmed by MATA Magway representatives #2, 5-6-2017, Magway;
MATA representatives, 29-5-2017, Yangon; CSO representative Mandalay #2,
3-6-2017, Mandalay.
14 Authors’ interviews with representatives of coal company #1 and #2 in
EITI MSG Magway, 11/12-12-2016, Magway; representative of small-scale oil
company in EITI MSG Magway, 11-12-2016, Magway; CSO representative in
EITI MSG Magway, 11-12-2016, Magway; representative of international oil
company in EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-2016, Magway; former MATA co-
ordinator #1, 22-9-2016, Yangon; CSO representative, 20-9-2016, Yangon;
representative of an international organisation, 6-9-2016, Yangon; re-
presentative of an international NGO, 20-9-2016, Yangon; representative of
ethnic CSO, 5-10-2016, Chiang Mai; representative #2 of border-based CSO, 7-
10-2016, Chiang Mai; MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay;
former MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay; representative of
national think tank, 30-5-2017, Yangon.
15 Author's interview with representative of Magway EITI Watch Group, 12-
12-2016, Magway.
16 Author's interview with company representative #1 in EITI MSG Magway,
11-12-2016, Magway.
17 Authors’ interviews with private sector representative, 3–6–2017,
Mandalay; MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay; re-
presentative of Magway EITI Watch Group, 12-12-2016, Magway; former
MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay; MATA Magway re-
presentative #3 and #4, 5-6-2017, Magway; company representative #1 in EITI
MSG Magway, 11-12-2016, Magway; former MATA coordinator #1, 22-9-2016,
Yangon; CSO representative in EITI MSG, 20-9-2016, Yangon.
18 Authors’ interviews with CSO representative in EITI MSG, 20-9-2016,
(footnote continued)
Yangon; former MATA coordinator #1, 22–9-2016, Yangon; MATA re-
presentatives, 29-5-2017, Yangon; company representative #1 in EITI MSG
Magway, 11-12-2016; MATA Magway representative #3, 5-6-2017, Magway.
19 Author's interviews with representative of Magway EITI Watch Group, 12-
12-2016, Magway; representative of coal company #2 in EITI MSG Magway,
12-12-2016, Magway; ﬁeld manager of international oil company in EITI MSG
Magway, 12-12-2016, Magway; secretary of international oil company in EITI
MSG Magway, 12-12-2016, Magway; representative of small-scale oil company
in EITI MSG Magway, 11-12-2016, Magway; representative of coal company #1
in EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-2016, Magway.
20 Author's interview with CSO representative, 20-9-2016, Yangon.
21 Authors’ interviews with company representative #1 in EITI MSG Magway,
11-12-2016, Magway; company representative #2 in EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-
2016, Magway; CSO representative Mandalay #1, 13-12-2016, Mandalay;
MATA representatives, 29-5-2017, Yangon; representative of national think
tank, 30-5-2017, Yangon.
22 Authors’ interviews with MATA Magway representative #4, 5-6-2017,
Magway; MATA private sector representative, 3-6-2017, Mandalay.
23 Author's interview with national coordinator of MATA, 29-11-2016,
Yangon.
24 Authors’ interview with MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017,
Magway.
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strong government and military.25
The establishment and functioning of MATA are a clear indication of
enhanced civil society participation and empowerment resulting from
the EITI process: “MATA helps to build strength and better connect to
people”.26 The perceived need to speak with one voice, however, has
also created disputes among CSOs. Some CSOs are critical of the fact
that only MATA members represent civil society in the EITI process:
“there is not a variety of voices, just the voice of MATA”.27 Some claim
that ethnic and border-based organisations are “marginalised” within
MATA, and that “there is a Yangon-centralisation. Funding-oriented. It's
more a parent-child relationship between Yangon-based groups and
subnational groups”.28 Some CSOs also have doubts about the extent to
which MATA represents communities that experience adverse impacts
of resource extraction.29 They argue that through their involvement in
the EITI process, MATA members “lose touch with the people on the
ground”.30 Other CSOs criticise so-called “dirty CSOs” for being closer
to the government and private sector than to citizens31 (see also Vijge,
2018). Still other CSOs, mainly those that are border-based, deliber-
ately choose not to engage in the EITI process, arguing that it “is
regulated by Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw” and that it “takes the attention
away from the real issues”.32
Given these new forms of in- and exclusion in civil society partici-
pation, some go so far as to argue that the EITI process divided rather
than united civil society.33 CSOs indicated their concern that due to
these disputes, regional and national government oﬃcials have “less
trust in CSOs”34 and their ability to represent Myanmar citizens. On the
other hand, the debates about representation also indicate an increasing
political space for, and self-conﬁdence of, diverse civil society actors to
raise their speciﬁc concerns in political contestations.
4.3. Accountability
The EITI is based on the assumption that enhanced transparency
and participation in the extractive industries sector help citizens to hold
responsible actors to account for the management of natural resources.
Since the EITI report in Myanmar has not been heavily taken up by
CSOs, its eﬀects on accountability in the extractive industries sector are
limited. However, the EITI process, including the SNCUs, did trigger
transformations in accountability, though to a limited extent.
An important transformation is the enhanced ability of CSOs and
citizens to demand action of the government and extractive industry
companies. Because of the MSG discussions that were held as part of the
SNCUs, CSOs can demand accountability if they think the government
or companies fail to follow EITI standards or other rules and regula-
tions, for example related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and
tax payments and use.35 As one interviewee argued: “They [companies]
are doing CSR because in the MSG, the CSOs are asking what kind of
activities they do in CSR”.36 In the subnational MSG discussions, CSOs
will also be “pushing companies to pay taxes and [pushing] the gov-
ernment for the taxes to be beneﬁcial for the people and for the country
(…) according to the EITI standards.”37 EITI-related activities also en-
hance communities’ and their leaders’ capacities to assess the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of extractive industry investments in their
region and their rights in demanding impact mitigation or beneﬁt-
sharing.38 This again shows that the transformations in transparency
and accountability go well beyond the EITI mandate.
Though the EITI process made it possible for CSOs to demand ac-
countability on resource extraction, the extent to which CSOs are also
able to evoke action by responsible actors is limited. Various inter-
viewees indicated that the SNCUs have so far failed to change the be-
haviour of extractive industry actors: “Many meetings, but very little
eﬀects”.39 At least one prominent CSO discontinued its engagement in
the EITI process, claiming that there had not been any changes in re-
source extraction on the ground.40 Indeed, though many actors in-
volved in Myanmar's EITI process strongly believe that the EITI has the
potential to reduce adverse impacts from resource extraction,41 many
also acknowledged that the impact of the EITI on actual practices of
resource extraction remains limited to date.42
There are substantial challenges to enhancing accountability in
Myanmar's extractive industries sector. The capacity and knowledge
base of citizens and civil society on natural resource governance in
Myanmar is still very low, particularly on highly technical topics such
as the EITI: “We don’t use [the EITI] because we don’t know what the
EITI is”.43 Furthermore, institutional mechanisms to hold actors to
25 Authors’ interviews with former MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017;
MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017, Magway.
26 Authors’ interview with MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017,
Magway.
27 Author's interview with CSO representative, 27-7-2017, Yangon. Aﬃrmed
by former CSO representative in EITI MSG Mandalay, 14-12-2016, Mandalay;
CSO representative Mandalay #3, 3-6-2017, Mandalay.
28 Author's interview with representative of ethnic CSO, 5-10-2016, Chiang
Mai. Aﬃrmed by representative of national think tank, 5-9-2016, Yangon; CSO
representative in EITI MSG, 20-9-2016, Yangon; representative of ethnic CSO,
5-10-2016, Chiang Mai; former CSO representative in EITI MSG Mandalay, 14-
12-2016, Mandalay; CSO representative Mandalay #4, 3-6-2017, Mandalay;
former CSO representative in EITI MSG Mandalay, 14-12-2016, Mandalay.
29 Authors’ interviews with CSO representative, 27-7-2017, Yangon; MATA
Magway representative #2, 5-6-2017, Magway; CSO representatives Mandalay
#2 and #3, 3-6-2017, Mandalay.
30 Author's interview with CSO representative, 27-7-2017, Yangon. Aﬃrmed
by former MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay.
31 Authors’ interviews with CSO representative Mandalay #3, 3-6-2017,
Mandalay; CSO representative Mandalay #1, 13-12-2016, Mandalay.
32 Author's interview with representative of ethnic CSO #2, 4-10-2016,
Chiang Mai.
33 Author's interview with former CSO representative in EITI MSG Mandalay,
14-12-2016, Mandalay.
34 Authors’ interview with MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017,
Magway. Aﬃrmed by former CSO representative in EITI MSG Mandalay, 14-12-
2016, Mandalay; CSO representative Mandalay #3, 3-6-2017, Mandalay; re-
presentative of national think tank, 30-5-2017, Yangon; MATA private sector
representative, 3-6-2017, Mandalay.
35 Authors’ interviews with MATA Magway representative #1, #3 and #4, 5-
6-2017; MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay; CSO re-
presentatives Mandalay #2 and #3, 3-6-2017, Mandalay; former MATA
Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay.
36 Author's interview with MATA Magway representative #3, 5-6-2017,
Magway.
37 Authors’ interviews with former MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017,
Mandalay. Aﬃrmed by MATA Magway representative #2, 5-6-2017, Magway.
38 Authors’ interviews with CSO representative Mandalay #2, 3-6-2017,
Mandalay; MATA Magway representative #1, 5-6-2017, Magway.
39 Author's interview with CSO representative, 27-7-2017, Yangon. Aﬃrmed
by CSO representative Mandalay #3, 3-6-2017, Mandalay; company re-
presentative #2 in EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-2016, Magway; MATA re-
presentatives, 29-5-2017, Yangon; CSO representative Mandalay #2, 3-6-2017,
Mandalay; MATA Magway representative #4, 5-6-2017, Magway.
40 Authors’ interviews with CSO representative Mandalay #3, 3–6–2017,
Mandalay; CSO representative, 27-7-2017, Yangon.
41 Authors’ interviews with MATA representatives, 29-5-2017, Yangon;
company representative #1 in EITI MSG Magway, 11-12-2016, Magway; CSO
representative Mandalay #3, 3-6-2017, Mandalay; MATA Magway re-
presentatives #1, #2 and #3, 5-6-2017, Magway; former MATA Mandalay re-
presentative, 4-6-2017, Mandalay; representative of national think tank, 30-5-
2017, Yangon; private sector representative, 3-6-2017, Mandalay.
42 Authors’ interviews with CSO representative Mandalay #3, 3-6-2017,
Mandalay; company representative #2 in EITI MSG Magway, 12-12-2016,
Magway; MATA representatives, 29-5-2017, Yangon; CSO representative
Mandalay #2, 3-6-2017, Mandalay; MATA Magway representative #4, 5-6-
2017, Magway; CSO representative, 27-7-2017, Yangon.
43 Author's interview with representative of Magway EITI Watch Group, 12-
M.J. Vijge, et al. Resources Policy 61 (2019) 200–209
206
account, such as project-level grievance mechanisms, are rarely avail-
able or accessible to Myanmar citizens or CSOs.44 The fact that CSOs
use the EITI process well beyond its oﬃcial mandate also shows the
perceived lack of more appropriate venues to hold actors to account on
issues related to resource extraction.
Another challenge to enhancing accountability through the SNCUs
is the limited decentralisation in Myanmar. State and regional gov-
ernments have limited mandates to manage their natural resources or
handle and spend taxes collected in their region (Adam Smith
International, 2015; Lynn and Oye, 2014). This reduces CSOs’ ability to
evoke actions from their regional government. It also limits the re-
levance of subnational MSGs. As one interviewee argued: “We only
have meetings to discuss. We don’t have meetings to solve the pro-
blems.”45 In a number of instances in Magway and Mandalay, CSOs
submitted reports regarding the impacts of extractive industries in their
region to the union level government.46 Most interviewees making re-
ference to this, however, said that they did not receive any response,
let alone witness any changes on the ground.47
5. Discussion: revisiting the EITI's theory of change
This section revisits the EITI's theory of change, presented in Section
2: “[t]he active participation of civil society in the EITI process is key to
ensure that transparency created by the EITI leads to greater account-
ability” (EITI, 2016, 42). Our results are depicted in Fig. 3.
As we showed, the EITI in Myanmar has oﬀered unprecedented
opportunities for CSOs to raise their voice on the governance of the
extractive industries sector. As a result of enhanced civil society parti-
cipation in the EITI process, CSOs learned to interact and collaborate
with the government and private sector, which contributed to the de-
velopment of common ground and understanding between these
groups. Beyond the outline of the EITI's theory of change, we showed
that such participation and collaboration stretch across the boundaries
of the oﬃcial MSG meetings. Here, interlinkages between the diﬀerent
aspects of institutional quality become apparent: enhanced transpar-
ency in the form of self-generated information enabled CSOs to more
eﬀectively communicate with companies, debate social and environ-
mental problems of mining, and, as a result, demand accountability,
even on issues that are beyond the EITI. This not only means that civil
society participation in resource governance facilitates the use of dis-
closed information to hold actors to account—as posited in the EITI's
theory of change—but also that participation is facilitated by the in-
creased availability of information. As such, the EITI process triggers a
self-reinforcing cycle in which participation leads to enhanced
transparency, which in turn further facilitates participation (circular
arrow in Fig. 3).
To organise civil society representation in the EITI process, CSOs
established the civil society alliance MATA. This resulted in signiﬁcant
capacity-building and representation of some, but not all, CSOs. These
new forms of in- and exclusion triggered conﬂicts among CSOs about
rightful representation. Arguably, trade-oﬀs exist between, on the one
hand, CSOs’ perceived need to speak with one voice and, on the other
hand, maintaining representation and on-the-ground understandings of
a diversity of actors aﬀected by resource extraction. This reveals the
inherent limitations of civil society participation, even in a case where
there is no evidence for active obstruction by the government, which is
often identiﬁed as the main bottleneck for participation in other EITI-
implementing countries (Aaronson, 2011; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Öge,
2017; Ospanova et al., 2013; Wilson and Alstine, 2014).
In early 2016, the oﬃcial EITI process was stalled for more than a
year. Unexpectedly, however, relations that had been built or improved
in the SNCUs were reorganised in spin-oﬀ meetings and activities, al-
lowing CSOs to continue to demand, exchange and generate (region-)
speciﬁc information related to resource extraction. This proved relevant
in holding extractive industry actors to account for their social and
environmental impacts, issues that go well beyond the scope of the EITI.
As such, accountability was furthered not so much by the “transparency
created by the EITI” (EITI, 2016, 42), but particularly by the generation
and exchange of information that goes beyond the EITI.
Though the EITI report and process enhanced transparency in
Myanmar's extractive industries sector, the EITI has so far mainly
reaped the low-hanging fruits. The EITI has not yet shed light on illegal
resource extraction, corrupt practices by state and non-state actors, or
resource extraction that is tied up with ethnic conﬂicts. There are also
important limitations in the extent to which the EITI in Magway and
Mandalay enhanced accountability. Though CSOs’ ability to demand
accountability has been enhanced, scarcity of accountability mechan-
isms and limited decentralisation in natural resource governance con-
strain CSOs’ ability to evoke actions from extractive industry actors in
their region (see also Vijge and Simpson, Forthcoming). In other words,
while the EITI has generated some answerability (Fox, 2007), the
transparency and participation it has triggered are not suﬃcient to
generate full accountability (represented by the dotted lines in Fig. 3).
6. Conclusion
Empirically, this article showed that—despite the limitations—the
EITI can trigger important transformations in institutional quality at
national and subnational levels in a resource curse context like
Myanmar's. Theoretically, we conclude that transformations in in-
stitutional quality are not necessarily characterised by a linear trajec-
tory of enhanced transparency—in the form of the EITI report—leading
to accountability, facilitated by civil society participation in multi-sta-
keholder groups (EITI, 2016). Instead, transformations are char-
acterised by spin-oﬀ eﬀects, dynamic interlinkages, reinforcing cycles,
and emerging trade-oﬀs and limitations of diﬀerent aspects of institu-
tional quality (Fig. 3). We argue that such complexity should be taken
Transparency
in and beyond
the EITI report
Answerability, but not
full accountability
Civil society
participation
in and beyond
MSGs
EITI
Fig. 3. Revisiting the EITI's theory of change: the spin-oﬀ eﬀects, reinforcing
cycle (↻) and limitations (represented by dotted arrows) between transpar-
ency, participation and accountability.
(footnote continued)
12-2016, Magway. Aﬃrmed by representative of oil company, 17-11-2016,
Yangon; head CSR of oil company, 17-11-2016, Yangon; former MATA co-
ordinator #1, 22-09 and 3-12-2016, Yangon; representative of political party,
Bago, 3-12-2016, Bago; township secretary of political party, 3-12-2016, Bago;
MATA Magway representative #3, 5-6-2017, Magway.
44 Author's interviews with strategic advisor of CSO, 20-9-2016, Yangon; EITI
senior technical and policy analyst, 13-9-2016, Yangon; former coordinator of
MATA, 22-9-2016, Yangon; former visiting fellow, national and international
think tank, 1-9-2016, London; Myanmar focal point, Global Witness, 31-8-2016,
London.
45 Author's interview with company representative #2 in EITI MSG Magway,
12-12-2016, Magway.
46 Authors’ interviews with MATA Mandalay representative, 4-6-2017,
Mandalay; MATA Magway representative #4, 5-6-2017, Magway; CSO re-
presentatives Mandalay #2 and #3, 3-6-2017, Mandalay; representative of
Magway EITI Watch Group, 12-12-2016, Magway; MATA Magway re-
presentative #4, 5-6-2017, Magway; former MATA Mandalay representative, 4-
6-2017, Mandalay.
47 Authors’ interviews with CSO representatives Mandalay #2 and #3, 3-6-
2017, Mandalay; representative of Magway EITI Watch Group, 12-12-2016,
Magway; MATA Magway representative #4, 5-6-2017, Magway.
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into account in the implementation of transparency initiatives such as
the EITI in resource curse contexts. Methodologically, we argue that
analyses that acknowledge this complexity are better able to contribute
insights into how institutional quality may address the resource curse
than analyses that draw static analytical boundaries around institu-
tional quality as a single unit of study.
Also important in such analyses is consideration of how governance
initiatives such as the EITI interact with broader transformation pro-
cesses. In Myanmar, the EITI is seen as a “central part” of the country's
democratisation process, which also coincides with multiple amend-
ments in the natural resource governance framework. This gives rise to
analytical challenges in determining to what extent the EITI triggers or
merely coincides with broader-scale processes. In our case, while trans-
formations in institutional quality may also be considered a result of
broader political transformations, interviewees explicitly referred to the
EITI as key in triggering these changes and in, as some framed it,
“improv[ing] our country towards a democratic society”.48 It is still
early days for many of the amendments in Myanmar's natural resource
governance framework to generate outcomes on the ground. Sub-
sequent analyses in Myanmar as well as other countries would therefore
be welcome to assess how the EITI transforms (interlinkages between)
aspects of institutional quality through time, how such changes interact
with broader reform processes, and how these translate into substantive
changes to address the resource curse.
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